“Our Power is Weakened by their Presence”: Refugee-Host Relations, Threat Perceptions and Identity Negotiations of South Lebanese Women

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Abstract

This research asserts the relevance of applying the feminist theory on collective identity to refugee-host relations. Since women are seen to embody the symbolic dimensions of a nation, host narratives about the “threat” that refugee women pose reveal the core tenets of host identity. I support this theoretical assertion through empirical research in South Lebanon. I interviewed 31 individuals across 10 predominately Shi’a villages to determine the ways in which South Lebanese women perceive Syrian women to be a threat. First, my respondents expressed fear that refugees’ higher birthrate will entrench existing economic and security concerns. Second, Lebanese women describe Syrian women as both conservative and immoral. This paradox indicates that balancing individual rights and familial obligations is central to the collective identity of South Lebanese women, which has been shaped by decades of sectarian conflict. Third, disadvantaged women who hope to achieve status and security through marriage believe that the relative desirability of Syrians endangers their prospects. The fear that Syrian women are “stealing our men” is sufficient to inspire behavioral change from four of my respondents, signaling a deeper renegotiation of identity. Since the wellbeing of refugees depends on host willingness to accommodate them, gendered concerns – and the identity tensions they highlight – cannot be ignored.

Key words: refugee-host relations, national identity, Lebanese women, social cohesion

1. Introduction

This study is inspired by an empirical puzzle I first encountered in the summer of 2014. I was in public transportation in Sur (Tyre) when I witnessed a Lebanese man attempt to clobber a Syrian woman with his cane. He shouted that Syrian Prime Minister Bashar al-Assad had debased Lebanon because of the number of women who were now in the streets. This encounter disturbed and intrigued me. It contrasted with the dominant media discourses about refugees in Lebanon, which emphasized the threat they posed to Lebanon’s economy and security situation. But his offence was caused by a cultural violation, that of ‘out-of-place’ women. Considering the historical, social, linguistic and even culinary similarities between Lebanese and Syrians – indeed, their dividing border was a French colonial invention in 1920 – gender norms signified one clear point of rupture (Thompson, 2000: 28).

Over the next two years, the contrasting representations I encountered of Syrian women confirmed that the animosity I had encountered in that public van in Sur was not a singular incident. During dozens of conversations, I was struck by Lebanese women’s accusation that Syrian women were unnaturally assertive, promiscuous, and/or “stealing our men.” Foreign aid workers similarly observed Lebanese citizens attacking refugee women’s participation in the public sphere as indicative of promiscuity or “unnatural” assertiveness (Concoran, 2015). These practices of cultural distancing indicate that they fear that Syrians compromise the cultural integrity of their nation, as opposed to just their economic and political stability. The paradox here is that Lebanese women, generally speaking, pride themselves on espousing more progressive gender norms than Syrian women. Such contradictory narratives of Syrians hinted at an enigma within Lebanese identity that a gendered analysis could help bring to light.

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Lebanon thus presents a relevant case study to examine refugee-host identity tensions through the theoretical lens of gender studies. The guiding questions are as follows: How do Lebanese women perceive Syrian women as a threat? In what way are these threats gendered? And, finally, what does this reveal about Lebanese women’s national identity?

1.2 Outline of Paper

To understand the cultural tensions between refugee and host communities, I first explore the scholarship that links gender norms to collective identities. I argue that pinpointing the root of such identity clashes are vital to ensure refugees’ wellbeing, and that gender theory provides a lens to do so. I then narrow my focus to Lebanon, documenting the political struggles within Lebanon and how they have influenced women’s behavior and self-perception. Against this backdrop, I analyze how South Lebanese view the influx of Syrian refugees as a threat, with particular emphasis on the themes of child rearing, propriety in dress and behavior, and marriage competition. In their descriptions of the Syrian “other,” South Lebanese women reveal the identity characteristics most central to their conception of themselves.

1.3 Methodology

I conducted 19 individual and small group interviews in May 2017. A total of 31 individuals were represented from 22 different households. My target group was Lebanese women, of whom 11 were married and 13 were single or divorced. Interviews were rarely private given that family members or neighbors were often present. As a result, the comments of four men and four Syrians were also included among the total number of participants.

I focused on the governorates of South Lebanon and Nabatieh, which are home to approximately 800,000 Lebanese and 120,000 registered Syrian refugees (Clark & Grande, 2017). As Syrians with financial means tend to settle in Beirut, refugees in the south are typically poorer and less educated. The South Lebanon and Nabatieh governorates are predominately Shi’a, and politically active young men may be inclined to join Hezbollah’s fighting in Syria. This suggests (and was emphasized by my participants) that the ratio of men to women has been skewed by war-related deaths. Gender concerns may therefore be more significant here than in other parts of the country. Furthermore, most of my interviews took place in rural communities. I made this choice after my city respondents reported having little contact with Syrians whereas village contexts fostered greater interaction.

Participants were identified using the snowball method. The initial contacts were young women that I had befriended when I worked with under-resourced communities in South Lebanon. Interviews usually began with an informal ‘vetting process’ that took place in women’s living rooms or on their balconies, over coffee and snacks. My intermediaries would answer the questions of my potential respondents about my identity and research project until their consent was gained and I was invited to begin. During this process, those introducing me emphasized my familiarity with the region due to my development background as well as my university affiliation.

Despite the ethnographic bent of my research, which is necessary to identify social tensions in refugee-host relations, I seek to avoid explanations that rely solely on cultural “essences” (Chalcraft, 2016: 10). Such representations contribute to orientalist tropes, which exaggerate disparities between the West and East and attribute the East’s “backwardness” to cultural differences (Said, 1978; Said, 1994; Abu-Lughod, 2001; Al-Ali, 2010; Spivak, 1993; Mohanty, 1998; Abu-Lughod, 2002). Instead, I ground descriptions of societal practices in the political and economic context that enable them. And when appropriate, I acknowledge how my positionality as Western researcher may have influenced the responses of my interviewees.

Although I stressed the anonymity of my respondents in accordance with ethical practices, most were less concerned than I. One young woman specifically requested that I use her full name in hopes that a prospective suiter might learn of her through my research. Nevertheless, in all other cases, respondents are referred to by a pseudonym with only their marital status, religion and village specified. Interviews began as semi-structured, but they evolved into unstructured interviews as women interjected their own anecdotes about the Syrian situation, giving each conversation a life of its own. I then analyzed what their concerns suggest about the core tenants of South Lebanese women’s identity, as supported by the theory on gender and collective identity discussed below.
2.1 Gender and Collective Identity

Since women are often symbols of the values of a particular society, female refugees embody the cultural danger that all refugees allegedly pose. In this study, then, gender theory serves as a lens that magnifies the “dividing line” between Lebanese and Syrians living in South Lebanon. In spite of a common language, religion, and even food, negotiations over gender norms expose the characteristics at the heart of South Lebanese women’s identity, which some perceive to be under attack. This lack of social cohesion contributes to discriminatory practices, to the detriment of Syrians’ wellbeing.

Gender theorists have long drawn attention to the symbolic role women hold within the nation (Kandiyoti, 1991; McClintock, 1993; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler, 2002). Because of women’s key role in biological reproduction, they are seen to culturally reproduce the nation. They embody its values and bear what Yuval-Davis terms the “burden of representation” (1997:45). Women’s comportment is therefore monitored by their community with the intention of preserving the nation’s cultural integrity (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 45). This is especially true in domains related to reproduction: 1) child raising, 2) priority in dress and behavior, and 3) choice of sexual/marriage partners. In their role as caregivers, women serve as mothers to their children, and symbolically, as mothers of the nation, transmitting values and behavioral conventions from one generation to the next (Kandiyoti, 1991: 1). Because of their symbolic role, women must be insulated from contamination. As a result, society regulates women’s dress and interactions with members of the opposite sex. Even women’s choice in sexual partners becomes a communal affair, with the delineation of permissible versus impermissible partner signaling where the boundaries between communities lie (Kandiyoti. 1991:1).

We can further look to gender norms to identify the boundary between “in-groups” and “out-groups” within society (i.e. – “hosts” and “refugees”). The cultural traits that a community claims as its own are time and situation dependent, but they become solidified through contact with others. Barth (1969) argues that the imagined boundary which divides communities is often more relevant than the cultural traits they encompass. If women embody the collectivity identity of a group, I affirm that they are equally key to identifying its limits.

Just as women of the “in-group” have a purity that must be defended, women of the “out-group” endanger its cultural integrity with the children they bear and the way of life that they embody. “The other’s women” are often ascribed the negative traits from which a society wants to distance itself (Yuval-Davis: 1997, 45). Since “identity” and “otherness” are constructed in tandem, the narratives that one group tells about “the other” reveals the core tenants of their own identity (Fedor, 2014; Theiler, 2003). We can therefore deduce the central values of the in-group – in this case, South Lebanese hosts – by studying their perceptions of the out-group’s gender norms – those of Syrian refugees.

Literature from the field of migration studies confirms that differences in gender norms provide a basis for “othering” and, with it, the construction of identity. For example, in Sri Lanka, Malathi de Alwis (1997) found that internally displaced women are perceived as morally corrupting to the surrounding society. Such suspicion stemmed from fears that women who work outside the home could not be sexually controlled (Ibid). Even though both groups in this study were Sri Lankan, stationary Sri Lankans distinguished themselves from the displaced by means of the “out-of-place” behavior of their women. Similarly, in Egypt, Fabos (2008) demonstrates how Sudanese Arab migrants in Cairo employ a gendered discourse about propriety to distinguish themselves from Egyptian Arabs. The supposed rectitude of Sudanese women is one way by which Sudanese “know” that they are Sudanese, despite the many cultural similarities between both communities (Ibid. 5).

I emphasize the relevance of the feminist theory on collective identity to refugee-host relations because of the implications for social cohesion. The UN defines social cohesion as the inclusion and exclusion mechanisms that mold perceptions of and behavior toward particular groups (Machinea, 2007). In a forced migration context, the wellbeing of refugees is tied to the resiliency of host communities, where citizens often become resentful at the sudden influx of foreigners (Chambers, 2008; Lawrie and Van Damme, 2003; Chatelard and Morris, 2011). Conflicts over resources are reinforced by clashes arising from collective identity concerns, where the interests of “us” and “the other” are pitted against one another in a zero-sum game (Stivachtis, 2008). Instead of seeing refugees as neighbors in need, hosts ascribe negative traits to them (Guay, 2015: 8). Such representations encourage exclusionary policy and exploitation.
In Lebanon, where one in four residents is a refugee who has fled Syria’s civil war, identity tensions have led to a breakdown in social cohesion with detrimental effects for refugees. In one study, over 90 percent of Lebanese perceived Syrians as a threat to their economic viability and to their value system (Harb & Saab, 2014: 5). Not coincidentally, 75-90 percent of respondents were in favor of nightly curfews for Syrians, restrictions on their political freedom, and for forbidding them from participating in the job market (Ibid). A summary of 15 field reports compiled by the charity World Vision specifies the need for additional scholarship on the gendered expression of such tensions (Guay, 2015: 7). My research advances that objective by examining host women’s fears about the arrival of Syrian women and the implications for Lebanese women’s identity.

2.2 Empirical Context

In this respect, my study adds to, and builds on, the literature about gender and collective identity in Lebanon. Lebanon provides a challenging, yet intriguing case context since decades of civil war and sectarian tension have eroded any coherent sense of national unity, earning it the title of “a ‘state’ without a ‘nation’” (Deeb, 2006: 13). Delegating the policing of gender norms has been one way in which the government has struck a balance of power between competing sects (Joseph, 1993). The sudden influx of Syrian refugees thus intersects with existing “in-group” and “out-group” struggles in Lebanon, with negotiation over gender roles at the fore.

France’s colonial legacy in the Levant divided Lebanon and Syria into two separate nations, binding Lebanon as a religiously heterogeneous territory. Upon Lebanon’s independence in 1943, the newly created National Pact delegated Sunni, Shi’a, Christian and Druze leaders the authority to govern all personal status matters in order to help maintain the tenuous balance of power between them. Religious courts were thus permitted to legislate on issues relating to marriage, divorce and child custody (Joseph, 1991: 191). In this way, local faith leaders held tremendous power over the lives of women. Furthermore, patriarchs traded the allegiance of their extended family for political favors from sectarian political leaders (zu’ama’), which incentivized male heads of households to regulate the behavior of women in their family. Such patterns were entrenched during the civil war from 1975-1990, where women relied on their family unit and religious community, and by extension, traditional gender norms, for protection and provision (Khatib, 2008: 448). To the present, sectarian identity inspires equal or greater allegiance for many women than national identity.

2.2.1 Characteristics of Shi’a Identity: Resistance, Patriarchal Connectivity and Modernity

My research focuses primarily on the Shi’a of South Lebanon. In addition to the political dynamics described above, women’s lives have been shaped by violent conflict between Hezbollah, a Shi’a paramilitary group, and the Israeli army, which occupied Southern Lebanon from 1982 to 2000. Within the literature on Sh’ia women in Lebanon, “resistance” thus emerges as one core component of their collective identity. After interviewing 46 Hezbollah supporters, Maria Holt documents the fierce pride among those who had lost sons or husbands when they “went for jihād” (2010: 376). Mourning mothers and widows gain respect and status within their community for their sacrifice. Many report feeling empowered by emulating the stoicism of Zaynab from the Qur’an, who also suffered the deaths of her male relatives (Ibid). Indeed, women’s participation is vital to the perpetuation of the cause; their endorsement justifies the death toll and bolsters popular support for Hezbollah activities within South Lebanon and abroad. While not all Shi’a women support Hezbollah, the emphasis on female strength and resistance leaves a lasting imprint on the social fabric. Additionally, mothers’ continued sacrifice – Hezbollah’s activities in Syria regularly claim the lives of young Lebanese men – has consequences for single Shi’a women looking to marry.

The second theme within the literature on Shi’a women’s collective identity is that of patriarchal connectivity. This term was introduced by Suad Joseph (1993) to describe the relational style in Lebanon that prioritizes elder and male voices in an intensely interconnected society. While men and women are mutually inclined toward familial relationships to cope with Lebanon’s instability, men are allowed greater influence over the lives of women and their juniors. This hierarchy encourages men to view their wives, daughters and sisters as extensions of themselves. Men thus become invested in ensuring the proper conduct of their female relatives, including their sexual propriety (Joseph, 1993: 469).

Yet this relational style does not necessary feel contrived or externally imposed; many women take pride in their embedded relationality. Within a Shi’a neighborhood in the capital city of Beirut, Lara Deeb found that the residents define a modern woman as “educated, outspoken, strong and visible, while also being pious and committed to her faith, family, and community” (Deeb, 2005: 217).
These Shi’a women describe “modernity” as a product of material and spiritual progress. Modernization is desired for the physical comforts it brings, but not at the expense of religious duty and commitment to one’s family, as they perceive occurs in the West (Ibid, 24). Similarly, religiosity is defined in contrast to the ‘spiritual backwardness’ of other parts of the Arab world where women are confined to exclusively domestic roles (Ibid, 24). Shi’a women therefore take pride in their material advancement and religious maturity, all while remaining closely connected to their extended community.

Within these overlapping value systems of resistance, patriarchal connectivity and modernity, marriage emerges as a highly significant institution. Men and women are seen as ‘naturally and essentially different’ and fundamentally complementary (Hasso, 2014: 110). Marriage thus signifies an individual’s transition to adulthood – the rite of passage through which a girl (bina’i) becomes a woman (mar’i). It also facilitates the union of extended families, with patrilocal, patrilineal marriage serving as the ideal (Abu Lughod, 1986). Women, in particular, may view marriage as a path to financial security and, in symbolic terms, a means of achieving the ‘modernity’ coveted among Lebanon’s Shi’a women (Singerman, 2007).

Yet marriage is not without risks; under sectarian law, Shi’a men can divorce or take a second wife at the slightest provocation (Joseph, 1993: 473). Men’s decision to do so is often attributed by the community to neglect on the part of their wives (Deeb, 2006: 2011). Kandiyoti describes women’s reliance on the institution as a “patriarchal bargain;” although marriage puts women in a vulnerable position, they derive their social and economic security from it (1988: 279). Thus, the expectations placed upon women from their family, sect, and society, create a complex social world, and for many, the presence of Syrians now threatens their ability to navigate it.

3. Refugee-Host Relations

In recounting my findings, I begin with women’s reflections on the economic and security situation. Although they are well-documented elsewhere, they indicate the severity of the threat that Syrians are perceived to pose (Hard and Saab, 2014; Ortman and Madsen, 2016). I then delve into gender-specific fears in order to unpack the descriptions of Syrian women as both domestic and indecent, conservative and immoral. In short, Lebanese women’s accusations against Syrian women center on childbirth and childrearing, impropriety in dress and comportment, and competition over marriage partners. The similarities between these concerns and feminist theory, not only reinforce women’s symbolic role in the nation, but also reveal some particularities of South Lebanon identity shaped by decades of sectarian conflict. Namely, balancing individual rights and familial obligations is central to the collective identity of South Lebanese women, and for some respondents, the presence of Syrians compromises their ability to do so.

3.1 Economic and Security Concerns

The interviews that I conducted demonstrate that South Lebanese women fear that Lebanon is being overrun by Syrians. They view the refugee issue as an existential threat, and the tension between these two communities is such that being called “Syrian” is an insult. One middle-class woman from Baysariah compared Lebanon’s problems to a science fiction film. “When I was a little girl, I saw a movie where they extracted people’s DNA and created clones to harvest for organs…After a while, the clone began to want the life that the human had. Eventually, he rose up and killed him. In ten years, this is what the Syrians will do to us.”

The demographic influx has significant ramifications for the Lebanese economy, which weighed heavily on people’s minds. Consistent with other surveys done in the region, respondents feared for their husband’s livelihoods (Harb& Saab, 2014: 8). During interviews, people regularly brought up examples of how rent prices have increased and wages have decreased. They referenced the number of Syrian taxi drivers, vegetable sellers and storeowners, and insisted that Syrians were driving down the bottom line of Lebanese business by charging less for goods and services.

Respondents also voiced concerns that Syrians were involved in nefarious activities while in Lebanon. They worried about extremist infiltration and an overall increase in crime. Sometimes this fear was tied directly to ISIS, as in the governorate of Nabatieh, where the municipality has reported that Syrians were attacked on the suspicion that they were terrorists (Al-Masri, 2016: 3). Other times it was explained by the general ignorance (jabb) of Syrian men, who were seen to lack the “civilized” behavior (badaran) that was central to Lebanese descriptions of themselves (Deeb, 2006: 16). As evidence, my respondents cited stories that they heard more often than their own personal experience. This trend suggests that their perceptions of Syrians were heavily influenced by media accounts, contributing to negative stereotypes (Guay, 2015: 7).
With some exceptions, most Lebanese surveyed felt that Syrians had it easy in Lebanon. Syrians ate on the Lebanese government’s tab, received excessive aid from the UN – which South Lebanese referred to as a “salary” (ma’ašli) – and paid less for healthcare and education. The respondents implied that Syrians had chosen this life; they could return to Syria if they wanted but preferred to stay. Such sentiments were voiced even by those who lived in close contact with Syrians, worked alongside them and/or volunteered in organizations that provided aid. They reiterated that Lebanese had remained in the country during their civil war and expressed frustration that Syrians had not done the same.

South Lebanese women considered this problem to be worthy of extraordinary state measures. Participants suggested that the government pass more restrictive labor laws, confine Syrians in camps and imprison anyone engaging in prostitution. Above all, they insisted that refugees return to the areas in Syria that are stable.

Amidst such harsh dictates, some sympathy was expressed for the difficulties that Syrians faced. A few respondents acknowledged that life is much more expensive in Lebanon than Syria and recognized that Syrians contribute to the Lebanese economy. Additionally, some participants mentioned that they had Syrian friends in other contexts, but in their neighborhood, the difference in education levels was too significant for a meaningful relationship. When I discussed these dynamics with a Lebanese aid worker, she reiterated the personal hit many Lebanese have taken. She recounted an incident in a pharmacy where the owner got upset when she discovered that the medications purchased were for refugees: “She started to yell at us, asking why we were enabling the Syrians, and we quickly left. It was only afterward that we learned that her husband had recently taken a second wife – a Syrian woman.” Such anecdotes speak of the strain placed upon Lebanon, and they suggest that Lebanese women are affected in gender-specific ways.

3.2 Gendered Concerns

3.2.1 Demographic Threat: The Foreign Womb

Although economic and security concerns were primarily attributed to male refugees (i.e. – Syrian men stealing jobs or committing crime), Syrian women were also constructed as a threat. The danger they posed was first and foremost demographic. As Yuval-Davis (1997) demonstrates, women biologically reproduce the nation; and Syrian women reproduce their nation – the wrong nation – on Lebanese soil. This problem was compounded by Syrian women’s high birthrate. While exact statistics do not exist for Syrian women in Lebanon, refugees in Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan have 42 live births per 1,000 people per year, which serves as a potential proxy (Adams, 2016). This figure is nearly 300% greater than the Lebanese birthrate of 14.4 live births per 1,000 people (CIA Factbook, 2016).

In response to questions about why Syrians have more children, South Lebanese women provided economic and cultural explanations. Some suspected them of attempting to augment the stipend they receive from the UN with each additional child. Others referenced the pressure within Arab society to have a son or the fact that Syrian women are accustomed to having more children because health care and education are cheaper in Syria. Given that the birthrate in Syria pre-civil war was less than at present – 23 live births per 1,000 people – couples may be motivated to replace family members that have been lost (Adams, 2016).

Lebanese women of all social classes describe Syrian’s population growth as an explosion (infiṣjar) waiting to happen. They assert that the boys born in Lebanon will eventually want jobs and girls will want husbands. Thus, the womb of Syrian women becomes a threat of its own; their high birthrate entrenches the economic and security issues that are perceived to endanger the Lebanese state.

Furthermore, refugee women reproduce their nation culturally as well as biologically when they rear their children in the host country (McClintock, 1993: 61). And South Lebanese women judged the parenting of Syrian women as below standard. During one interview, Fatima, a Shi’a woman from Zifta, exclaimed, “I saw a pregnant woman with a line of children following behind her. Five behind and one inside. She had them all here in Lebanon. This is how ducks behave, not humans!” Mothers emphasized the care with which they dressed their children, whereas Syrian children were dirty and played in the streets – a direct reflection of the neglect of their mothers.

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2 As many as 36,000 refugee children in Lebanon have been born stateless because their parents lack the necessary documents to register them for a Syrian birth certificate (Al Raifai, 2015).
Common comparisons of the difference in child rearing styles included “orderly vs. disorderly,” “disciplined vs. ill-behaved,” and producing “quality vs. quantity”. The distinction implied was that having children is not the same as mothering, and Syrian women failed to perform the second.

3.2.2 Dress and Comportment: Conservative Yet Immoral

South Lebanese women readily compare themselves to Syrian women, even without being provoked. This pattern suggests that Lebanese sometimes construct their identity in opposition to the Syrian “other.” In addition to reproducing the cultural core of a nation, women reproduce its limits (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 45-46). Such boundaries are often related to women’s sexual behavior, and by extension, comportment with the opposite sex. In Lebanon, this process of differentiation is nuanced and convoluted because Lebanese women take pride in their independence and freedom to associate across genders. These values contrast with their representation of Syrian women, who they simultaneously describe as conservative and immoral in their interactions with men. This paradox reveals the dualities in South Lebanese women’s national identity because of Lebanon’s sectarian history.

When reflecting on their own identity, the five words South Lebanese women most often applied to themselves were strong, educated, cultured, open-minded and conceited/superior (shayfehala, literally “seeing herself”). Notably, women’s descriptions of what it meant to be Lebanese varied based on socio-economic status. Middle class women, for example, placed a high value on appearance, which was something they, as well as their lower-class counterparts, described in jest. “To be Lebanese is to have no money and yet to live like the rich. We focus on our appearance; we wear top brands and love fashion. If we have 500 lira, we spend 1000.” A well-kept appearance reflects the financial prosperity Lebanese women equate with modernity. Whereas an ideal woman manages to be fashionable without succumbing to materialism, not all women (are seen to) successfully strike this balance (Deeb, 2006: 18).

Many individuals took pride in Lebanese women’s ability to enjoy certain freedoms while still upholding their modesty, especially in mixed educational and professional settings. Some attributed this “open-minded” attitude regarding gender to Lebanon’s relationship with the West. Whereas Deeb’s ethnography portrays pious women’s contentious relationship with Western influence, my participants seemed eager to compare themselves to Western women (2006: 24). For example, one middle-aged Shi’a respondent from Dewar spoke of being more at home in Italy than Syrians appear in Lebanon. Such comments may constitute an attempt to rebuff the stereotype of the oppressed “third-world woman” to a Western researcher (Mohanty, 2003).

Alternatively, Jawaher from Sur attributed the strength of Lebanese women, not to their interaction with the West, but to their participation in the resistance. She proudly recounted constructing makeshift explosives and refusing to betray her fellow fighters when captured by Israeli troops. She asserted that this range of experiences made Lebanese women strong. This account resonates with Holt’s (2010) description of Shi’a women’s participation in Hezbollah’s struggle. Yet this proud assertion of female power was made by women of various political persuasions, and even by Sunni women in the South; thus, it is not exclusively tied to military and political resistance to Israel.

Without being prompted, South Lebanese women contrasted themselves with other Arab women, and especially with Syrians, when describing their strength and independence. Mirna, a young single from ‘Ainta al Jbal explained, “Lebanese women know the difference between good and evil and between right and wrong, but for Syrians, everything is forbidden. Don’t see, don’t touch! But it’s not wrong to leave your face uncovered or to shake a man’s hand.” Participants implied that Syrian women defer to men both in casual encounters and within the family unit. In contrast, Lebanese women highlighted their high status in the family, such as the decisions they made with their husband or the times they defied their mother-in-law.

Even lower-class Lebanese women in difficult circumstances, who, for example, had contentious marriages or bore large agricultural responsibilities, still emphasized their refusal to accept mistreatment as a sign of their strength. The living situation of such respondents more closely mirrored that of Syrian refugees than their middle-class Lebanese counterparts. Yet when it came to issues of marital tension, they insisted that they knew their rights whereas Syrian women did not. Many Lebanese women pointed to female Syrian neighbors who suffered from domestic violence, and they expressed disbelief that these women did not leave their husbands.
While existing research suggests that domestic violence is also prevalent among Lebanese families – some studies suggest one in three women have experienced it – the frequency with which Lebanese women claimed to know Syrian victims has significant implications for protection work (Usta et al., 2006: 208). Furthermore, it suggests that confidence in their ability to assert themselves is an identity marker that transcends all economic strata of Lebanese society.

On the topic of how Syrians have changed since arriving in Lebanon, gender norms and education were the most frequently mentioned. South Lebanese women observe that Syrian women are becoming more independent and adopting Lebanese customs. The participants described changes in Syrians’ dress, such as exchanging skirts for pants, as well as adjustments in their vocabulary and accent. Their interactions with men were, for some, a sign of their integration, for others, a sign that they had lost their propriety. One young Shi’a woman vented, “Their women have faces full of makeup. Before they wore long skirts; now they strut around in jeans. They act cocky, sitting with their legs wide open for the world to see. They used to be shy, but not anymore.”

Women who insisted that Syrian women had become promiscuous since coming to Lebanon evidenced this claim with complaints of increased prostitution. They expressed contempt for the perceived increase of streetwalkers, brothels and temporary marriage contracts. They told stories of Syrian women receiving strange men into their homes and of sons pimping their mothers. Syrian women were described as dirty for their sexual misconduct, even though most South Lebanese women acknowledged that not all Syrian women engaged in prostitution.

The discrepancy in descriptions about Syrian women’s sexual conduct, and behavior with men more generally, reveals the relationality central to Lebanese women’s identity. On the one hand, the definition of “modernity” that they have embraced paints women as active agents inside and outside the home (Deeb, 2006: 30). On the other hand, Lebanon’s history of sectarianism has engrained an orientation toward family and sect for survival. As Joseph (1994) has demonstrated, women’s propriety reflects on the honor of their community; certain norms must be respected and obligations met. This tension is reflected in the dualities that South Lebanese women presented: young singles shared that they go out with friends, but they know not to drink. Married women proudly toted that they worked outside the home, but insisted their children were well cared for.

Their accusation was that Syrian women, as they become increasingly liberal, fail to grasp this nuance. As a result, Lebanese women’s descriptions of Syrian women are filled with anecdotes both of domesticity and promiscuity. As Lebanese women observe the strides Syrian women are taking toward greater independence, some fear that they will misuse their newfound freedom. Fatima from Zifta explained, “The rules of my culture are written inside of me. Even if I went to another country, I would know not to drink or associate inappropriately with men. But for Syrians, their culture comes from their community. The war has destroyed their community, and so they have lost their culture.”

As my interviews focused on perceptions, rather than statistics, it is unclear how accurate these descriptions are. Some evidence exists of increased prostitution due to the destitution of Syrian women (Zand, 2017). Yet it is an oft observed phenomenon that foreign women are likely to be sexualized (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 51; McClintock, 1993: 61; Yuval-Davis & Stoetzler, 2002:338). Thus, whether they are ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ in their interactions with men, Syrians are unlikely to be viewed in a positive light. This catch-22 suggests that South Lebanese women’s narratives about refugees are a greater reflection of their own identity negotiations than of Syrian women’s behavior.

3.2.3. Marriage Competition: “Stealing Our Men”

One of the ways that Lebanese women exercise their rights as strong but still relationally connected is within the context of marriage. Yet for lower-class women, Syrians represented competition for the affections of Lebanese males. Many participants condemned Lebanese-Syrian marriages as proof that refugee women were “stealing our men.”

South Lebanese women believe that Syrian women may be desirable for their cheaper dowry (maher) and the fewer demands they place on their prospective groom. The dowry prices for a Syrian girl reportedly ranged from $1,000 to $5,000 and were arranged and received by her parents. After confirming that he had heard these quotes as well, one Lebanese man exclaimed, “For such an amount, I could get married every day.” In keeping with the “conservative” descriptor, Syrian women were also described as attractive because they are more deferential to the men in their lives. For example, they willingly accept to live with their husband’s family, whereas Lebanese women want their own house.
Instead of working, Syrian women were perceived as attending exclusively to domestic duties and as prioritizing the men in their lives. In Dewar, neighbors gossiped about a local Lebanese man who took a Syrian bride. When reprimanded that there were many eligible Lebanese women to choose from, he asserted that “a Lebanese woman may cook and clean for you, but a Syrian woman will even wash your feet.”

The classification of intermarriage between Lebanese men and Syrian women as a problem was not universal. Most middle-class women did not report it happening with enough frequency within their social group to be worrisome. They expressed more consternation at the number of perspective partners who moved overseas for work or were not interested in marriage (Singerman, 2007: 5).

The women who viewed Syrians as competition tended to be lower middle-class or lower-class. For many, it was an issue of demographics – problematic at the societal level, but it did not affect them. Respondents who fell into this category talked about the number of men who died in Lebanon’s many conflicts. They worried that Lebanese girls would remain old maids, denying them the social status and economic stability secured through marriage.

For four women in my sample, however, the marriage competition that Syrian women posed threatened them personally. Zahra from Zifta confided that she has grown weary of living in her parents’ home and caring for her siblings. She hoped that marriage would bring her greater independence and financial stability but considered the presence of “submissive” Syrian women a direct impediment to her realization of this dream:

Since the Syrians came, my life has changed 90%. A man wanted to marry me (ija ‘ariis) but he took my cousin instead who is Syrian. This really upset me. I asked myself “Am I not beautiful enough?” But on the contrary, I’m prettier than her. “Is it because my demands are too high?,” but I was not asking for very much. I know why. It’s because Syrian women are different from us. She will work for him and accept however he treats her. That’s why he chose her instead of me.

Single women were not the only demographic of South Lebanese concerned. One married woman confided her suspicion that her husband had taken a fancy to a Syrian girl and would take a second wife (zowwej ‘alayha). She shared feelings of helplessness; her life as a South Lebanese woman was devoid of security or protection. The four South Lebanese women similarly affected all suffered overlapping relational and socioeconomic vulnerability. Whether single, divorced or married, they had a difficult home life and did not possess the economic recourse necessary to achieve stability.

Women in such positions reported employing different strategies to win or keep their husband. For Zahra, the presence of Syrians required her to lower her standards. She recognized that “after all, it is not two men in a house, but a man and a woman,” by which she explained that she may have to compromise the freedoms she previously expected to find a willing partner. While she had desired mutual respect and love, she now prioritized security over romance.

Such tradeoffs were also made by married women. Those who feared their husbands would take a second wife reported doting on them with increased care, such as preparing their favorite dishes or acquiescing to requests for increased sexual relations. These adjustments exemplify Kandiyoti’s “patriarchal bargain” where women participate in institutions that elevate men at their expense in order to secure their future (1988: 279). Although the four participants in my study acknowledged that they were “moving backwards” by catering to the whims of their actual or prospective husbands, such measures felt necessary given the ease with which Lebanese men could take a Syrian wife.

When such behavioral modifications are held in tandem with South Lebanese women’s self-descriptions as “strong” and “knowing our rights,” it appears that the presence of Syrians forces a re-negotiation of their collective identity. Such evolutions are tied to changes in men’s preferences; women report that just as Syrian women have become more “liberal,” Lebanese men have seen the treatment that Syrian men receive and desire it for themselves. South Lebanese women who had economic means and relational security insisted they would never surrender their freedom, but some women did not have this luxury. Considering the relational interdependence of South Lebanese women on their family and religious community, marriage competition affects their ability to navigate their social world. Fatima from Zifta lamented that “our power [as women] is weakened by their presence.”

Syrians and Lebanese both emphasized that these marriages were often only for pleasure and that Lebanese men considered Syrian women to be easily disposable. One respondent’s neighbor, a man of 70, married a Syrian girl of 18 and died two days later, leaving her a widow.
Other stories circulated of Syrian brides left behind when their husbands moved overseas or married without the dignity of a wedding celebration. Since impoverished Syrians more readily accept such marriages than those with means, refugees who are destitute become a bigger threat than those in the middle-class. Such dynamics have direct consequences for social cohesion. Because the vulnerability of Syrian women negatively affects South Lebanese women, refugee women’s suffering is more likely to be met with resentment than compassion.

The ways in which Syrian women represent a threat to their Lebanese counterparts provide necessary insight into the lack of social cohesion in Lebanon. My respondents’ insistence that Syrian women have fewer children, stop engaging in prostitution, and, when possible, return to Syria, is influenced by their fears for their own wellbeing and for the stability of Lebanon. The country they call home has become increasingly unfamiliar and hostile, creating for many a loss of security, and for some, a crisis of identity.

4. Conclusion

The findings of my research confirm that Lebanese’ relationship with Syrians is marred by identity tensions. South Lebanese women echo the economic and security concerns that have been well-documented in the region. But while they blame Syrian men for stealing jobs or committing terrorist acts, they hold Syrian women specifically accountable for perpetuating such issues through their high birthrate.

The focus on women was inspired by a paradox: How are Syrian women perceived as more conservative and yet immoral? The interviews reinforced feminist literature that documents how women represent the boundaries between societies (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 46; McClintock, 1993: 63). Lebanese women readily defined themselves in comparison with Syrians. They emphasized their relative sophistication and status in their family. Participants depicted Syrians as submissive to the men in their life while simultaneously accusing them of immoral behavior. Through this contradiction, they implied that as Syrian women acclimatize to the relative freedom in Lebanon, they are losing propriety. Such complaints suggest that central to South Lebanese women’s national identity is the ability to enjoy personal freedoms while still upholding expected gender norms (Joseph, 1993: 477; Deeb, 2006: 30).

Refugee women, therefore, pose a danger to the extent that they hinder Lebanese women’s ability to exercise their “rights.” This trend was especially evident among lower-class women regarding marriage. There is long-established literature on the importance of marriage for women in the Muslim world, and Lebanese women took pride in their status as wives (Joseph, 1993: 473). Yet some interviewees voiced the concern that Syrian women were “stealing Lebanese men.” Married women feared their husband would take a second, Syrian wife, and single women wondered if they had been overlooked in favor of a Syrian girl. Four of 24 interviewees specifically reported changing their behavior to keep or woo a husband, whose marriage preferences had been swayed by the presence of “submissive” Syrian women. Since Lebanese women consistently emphasized their relative independence, this threat represents an attack to their national identity as well as their individual prospects.

The implications of this research are many. Firstly, it has relevance for the efforts of NGOs in the region that are focused on social cohesion. My findings suggest that for Lebanese the re-negotiation of gender norms inspired by the influx of Syrians feels threatening. Increased protection is part of the solution; reducing the vulnerability of Syrian women to domestic violence, prostitution and exploitative marriages will decrease the behaviors that Lebanese women find troubling, as well as improve the lives of Syrians. But initiatives that specifically build relationship between Lebanese and Syrian women are also necessary to reduce the stereotypes that hinder willingness to accommodate refugees.

How Syrians respond to the subsequent hostility presents an avenue for future research – the second implication of this work. Syrians are not passive recipients of stigma but, like other marginalized communities, adapt to and resist the oppression they face (Ryan, 2011). Additional studies should explore the techniques that Syrian women adopt to navigate the effects of such stereotyping as well as to verify the veracity of Lebanese women’s perceptions. Furthermore, it merits testing if the refugee-host dynamics observed in South Lebanon similarly play out in other regions of Lebanon and/or persist in a larger sample size.

Emphasizing the cultural element of refugee-host relations, especially as expressed through negotiation over gender roles, may appear trivial in relation to economic and security concerns. Indeed, these issues were significant for Lebanese women as well as men. Yet the tensions sparked due to transgressed gender norms contribute to the construction of a host “us” and a refugee “other.”
This dichotomy, as illustrated by the interviews, creates a zero-sum competition between refugees and hosts, where the “gains” that Syrians make are interpreted as a “loss” for South Lebanese, whether in the domain of jobs or husbands.

Indeed, the relevance of gender norms for refugee’s wellbeing should not be overlooked. This research focused on South Lebanon, requiring an understanding of the unique blend of political, economic and cultural factors that influence how collective identity is expressed there. Yet forced displacement is increasing on a global scale, as climate change and intractable conflict incites people to flee across international borders in pursuit of safety. Such demographic trends will bring other host and refugee populations together with their own societal negotiations and identity clashes. In seeking to understand the root causes of tensions, gender roles provide a means by which to examine the distinct concerns of host women as well as the broader cultural barriers to social cohesion. As a methodological lens and a subject of study, gender thus serves as a key tool to analyze and expand the capacity of host populations to accommodate refugees.

Bibliography


